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INTRODUCING THE TWO AND A HALF HURDLES FROM THE
EUROZONE TO U.S. COURTS

T

he recent financial unrest in Europe has created significant distressed opportunities. Buyers with free capital
have been able to obtain significant quantities of distressed assets at free fall pricing. In a typical arms-length transaction,
these buyers would leave without further concern for the viability of their counterparties. But these parties may soon find
themselves reacquainted with their sweetheart deals if their
counterparties fail to weather financial depressions and seek
bankruptcy protection before the waves subside.
When storms settle and economies improve, assets whose
values were temporarily distressed often experience a sudden
rebound in value. Such price fluctuations create incentives for
counterparties to reclaim assets that once seemed like broken
glass, but now appear to be crown jewels. Fraudulent transfer
laws, which date back to the Statute of Elizabeth in the sixteenth-century,1 allow courts to unwind transactions after the
fact. Before June 2011, U.S. bankruptcy courts regularly used
fraudulent transfer provisions in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
(“the Code”)2 to reach domestic transactions with little fanfare.3
But recent shifts in domestic jurisprudence may affect U.S.
* B.B.A., in Finance cum laude, Baylor University Hankamer School of Business; J.D., cum laude, SMU Dedman School of Law; Managing Editor of The
International Lawyer (2012–2013). He will be serving as a judicial clerk for
the Honorable D. Michael Lynn, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of
Texas. The author would like to thank Chris D. Wallis, CEO & CIO of
Vaughan Nelson Investment Management, for his prophetic discussions
about Europe; Omar J. Alaniz, Special Counsel at Baker Botts, LLP, for sharing (and debating) his research and interpretation of Stern v. Marshall; and
Mary, his wife and CEO of the Springer Household, for her patience and support.
1. 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1571) (Eng.).
2. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (2006).
3. See Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp.), 456 B.R.
318, 320–21 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (“For over twenty-five years, my colleagues and I have operated with the understanding that we were properly
constituted judges . . . I have entered countless orders as final without a second thought about the legitimacy . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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bankruptcy courts’ ability to exercise both jurisdiction and constitutional authority over domestic and foreign transfers.
This Article discusses the link between the debt crisis in the
Eurozone and a potential flood of future litigation to unwind
foreign transactions in U.S. courts. Specifically, this article will
address the two and a half hurdles litigants must overcome to
reach foreign transactions with U.S. bankruptcy law. Part II
will briefly describe how economic forces created these distressed opportunities in the Eurozone. Part III will discuss how
improving global economies create incentives for fraudulent
transfer actions in U.S. courts and analyze a recent example.
Part IV will outline how the 2005 Amendments to the Code, an
ensuing circuit split over extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Stern v. Marshall have
created the two and a half hurdles. Finally, Part V will offer
arguments for litigants to overcome or to defend the hurdles to
U.S. adjudication.
I. REASON FOR CONCERN: DISTRESSED OPPORTUNITIES IN THE
EUROZONE
A. Economic Woes in the Eurozone
As a harbinger of the 2008 financial crisis, Warren Buffet
was famously quoted as saying: “It’s only when the tide goes
out that you can see who’s swimming naked.”4 The financial
tides accompanying the aftershocks of the 2008 financial depression uncovered considerable concern for the bare balance
sheets across the Eurozone. A severe debt crisis stemming from
the banking and property bubbles led to liquidity constraints,
defaults, and downgrades across the Eurozone; most notably in
Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain.5 Persistent fiscal
profligacy led to two separate sovereign bailouts for Greece, in
a union too big to fail.6 The ripple effects of these financial woes

4. America’s Economy: Danger Time for America, ECONOMIST, Jan. 14,
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 746681.
5. See Harriet Torry, Germany Approves Cyprus Bailout, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 19, 2013, at A12; Marcus Walker, Budget Treaty: Neither Panacea Nor
Poison, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2012, at A8.
6. See id. Aside from pejorative characterizations, “too big to fail” means
that the aggregate gross domestic product (“GDP”) of a country is smaller
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have reached private sector sources of liquidity, forcing both
private and public financial institutions alike to seek liquidity
from a consortium of international investors.7 These efforts are
to fill an estimated balance-sheet shortfall of €1 to 1.3 trillion
for Europe’s major banks.8 In January 2012, one expert estimated that the Eurozone needed approximately €3 trillion of
fresh capital to create sufficient liquidity.9
To correct the gap between book value and the actual value of
the bad assets, the Eurozone must face a significant deleveraging process.10 Europe has three basic options for deleveraging:
(1) raise money, (2) print money, or (3) default and deflate.11
The third option of markdowns provides immediate relief, but
carries significant consequences, including potentially reigniting global financial panic.12 The European Central Bank
(“ECB”) appeared to have adopted the second option by the
spring of 2012, when it began flooding Europe’s banks with
more than half a trillion euros of fresh capital.13 Despite the
increased lending and artificially-fixed low rates, many of Europe’s major banks have refused to accept funds, opting instead

than the potential liabilities of a particular market sector, which is most often the financial or banking sector of an economy.
7. See Alkman Granitsas et. al., Greece Passes Sweeping Cuts, WALL ST.
J., Feb. 13, 2012, at A1.
8. Telephone Interview with Chris D. Wallis, Chief Exec. Officer & Chief
Inv. Officer, Vaughan Nelson Inv. Mgt. (Jan. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Wallis
Interview]; Chris Wallis, Chief Exec. Officer & Chief Inv. Officer, Vaughan
Nelson Inv. Mgt., Presentation to the Baylor Angel Network: Investment
Risks Inherent in Global Economic Rebalancing (Feb. 17, 2012) [hereinafter
Presentation to BAN].
9. Wallis Interview, supra note 8.
10. See STEPHEN G. MOYER, DISTRESSED DEBT ANALYSIS: STRATEGIES FOR
SPECULATIVE INVESTORS 207 (2005). Deleveraging is the process by which a
company or country reduces the amount of debt or “leverage” from its balance
sheet. Id.
11. Wallis Interview, supra note 8. Under the “default and deflate” option,
Europe could have gambled systemic risk either by immediately marking the
bad assets’ values down to market value or by accepting an estimated 20%
deflation annually for three to five years. Id. Either result would have the
opposite outcome of the first two options: a decreasing money supply. Id.
12. Id.
13. See Geoffrey T. Smith, ECB Chief Says Bank Helped Avert Disaster,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2012, at A9.

2013]

EUROZONE DEBTS & U.S. COURTS

1113

for private investment and off-balance sheet restructurings.14 If
the situation deteriorates and remedial measures prove insufficient, the United States could even take drastic measures to
insulate and protect itself, which would leave Europe more
vulnerable to take the leverage hemlock alone.15
In coordination with the ECB’s central funding efforts, the
Eurozone countries have also completed member-funded
bailouts of troubled Eurozone countries.16 The second round of
bailouts for Greece in February 2012 staved off another potentially chaotic liquidity crisis that would have threatened defaults by other member nations, such as Spain and Italy. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble called for significant
austerity measures and reforms amidst concern that increasing
financial ties with Greece would threaten “[Germany’s] ability
to pay for pensions and health care in an aging society.”17 Germany insisted throughout the negotiations that Greece adopt
austerity measures, tighten public spending, and improve on
tax collection.18 Leaders of the twenty-five EU governments
agreed on January 31, 2012, to provide Greece with approximately €130 billion (US$171.5 billion) of aid, which included
assistance from the International Monetary Fund.19 In return,
the Greek Parliament agreed to significant austerity measures,
yielding to the German-led charge for tighter fiscal discipline.20
These measures included “steep cuts in private-sector wages,
sacking 15,000 public-sector workers and drumming up another [three] billion euros in government-spending cuts [in
2012].”21

14. See David Enrich, Some Europe Banks Shun ECB Loans, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 7, 2012, at C1.
15. See Wallis Interview, supra note 8. One such drastic measure could
involve nationalization of key U.S banks to consolidate U.S. balance sheets
amidst the turmoil created by a potential immediate deleveraging in Europe.
Id.
16. Matthew Dalton et. al., Europe Reaches a Greek Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb.
21, 2012, at A1.
17. Marcus Walker et. al., Germany Warns Greece on Aid Funds, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 30, 2012, at A7.
18. Id.
19. Granitsas, supra note 7, at A1.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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The measures have caused considerable strife in both the
Greek Parliament, where parties were expelled “for not toeing
the party line,” and the streets of Athens, where protestors continued to oppose any cuts in Greece’s public spending.22 The
spending cuts continued for 2013 budgets amid negotiations to
reduce Greece’s debt to “manageable levels.”23 As in Greece,
austerity measures across the Eurozone were met with similar
hostilities as workers organized strikes in Spain and Portugal.24 Cyprus too was forced to agree to overhaul its public finance system and restructure its two biggest banks in return
for €10 billion ($13.05 billion) bailout from its international
creditors.25 Although the negotiations remained precarious at
the time, EU leaders accepted the Nobel Peace Prize on December 10, 2012, for their efforts.26
In addition to the bickering among Eurozone countries over
austerity and liquidity measures, the Eurozone faces a number
of other ancillary barriers that threaten to hinder already weak
economies. Amidst these liquidity disruptions—and perhaps
because of the constraints—the Eurozone now faces the prospect of exporting its pool of skilled labor, as many former European colonies in Latin America have started to lure skilled
professionals.27 The 2014 World Cup of soccer and 2016 Olympic Games are creating considerable opportunities in Brazil, as
22. Id.
23. Gabriele Steinhauser & Stephen Fidler, Lenders at Odds over Greek
Debt, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2012, at A17.
24. Matt Moffett et. al, Big Europe Strikes Have Little Effect, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 15, 2012, at A11.
25. Torry, supra note 5, at A12.
26. Gabriele Steinhauser & Kjetil Malkenes Hovland, EU Bickering Pauses for Nobel, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2012, at A12. One can only hope that the
triumphant photo of French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel clasping hands in celebration of the prize is not looked
upon in the future with similar disbelief as President George Bush’s infamous “Mission Accomplished” photo. Compare Amid Tensions, Europe’s Leaders Accept Peace Prize, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2012, at A1 (celebrating, in 2012,
success in averting crises in the Eurozone), with Bob Kemper, Bush: Iraq War
Won; But President Warns ‘Dangerous Work’ Lies Ahead in Global Terror
Fight, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2003, at C1 (celebrating, in 2003, success in Iraq
while a banner saying “Mission Accomplished” was visible in the background).
27. Richard Boudreaux & Paulo Prada, Europe Hit by Downgrades, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 14, 2012, at A1.
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the country scrambles to build accommodations, venues, and
airport terminals.28 Meanwhile, the Eurozone faces economic
contractions, with GDP falling 1% to 1.5% in the fourth quarter
of 2011 and “[a] steady unemployment rate across the region
. . . [rising to] the highest level since the first quarter of
2001.”29 Demonstrating a trend across the Eurozone, almost
60% of the “37,000 Spanish citizens who left the country in
2010 . . . emigrated to countries outside the European Union.”30
If this trend continues, members of the EU must overcome declining economic growth and increasing global competition with
a diminishing skilled work force.
B. Applying Traditional Definitions of Distressed Assets to the
Eurozone
The confluences of the liquidity crisis, infighting over austerity measures, and increased financial ties across the Eurozone
have created distressed opportunities for buyers with free capital. Distressed opportunities exist in many forms; in fact,
“[t]here is no universally recognized definition of distressed
debt.”31 Four general definitions often guide the term, including
(1) third-party ratings, (2) liquidity availability, (3) debt
spreads, and (4) debt and equity nominal trading values.
Rating agencies, the most common prognosticators of financial strength, are third-party companies that independently
assess investment quality.32 The major rating agencies use different labels to describe a ten-grade system that places bonds
below a certain category as being “junk.”33 Ratings affect a
company’s ability to raise capital as ratings below a certain
level prevent certain investors, such as pension and endow28. See id.
29. Ilona Billington, Contraction Threat Clouds Euro Zone, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 1, 2012, at A10.
30. Boudreaux & Prada, supra note 27, at A1 (emphasis added).
31. MOYER, supra note 10, at 6.
32. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Competition and Credit Ratings Agencies, at 5–6, DAF/COMP (2010) 29 (Oct.
5, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/regreform/sectors/46825342.pdf.
The three major rating agencies, which together control more than 90% of the
market, include Standard & Poor (S&P), Moody’s Investor Services, and Fitch
IBCA. Id. at 12.
33. MOYER, supra note 10, at 6.
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ment funds, from investing in the company’s debt or equity securities. But the rating agencies have been severely criticized
for their failure to assess companies’ financial viability accurately, most notably in the wake of Enron and the structured
investments leading to the 2008 financial crisis.34
Unfortunately, without sufficient oversight, ratings may be
driven—or at least delayed—by politics as much as financial
strength.35 For instance, the long-expected Eurozone downgrades in 2012 were received with little significant reaction in
the markets.36 S&P and Fitch lowered ratings across the Eurozone in January, and Moody’s followed suit in February 2012,
lowering the ratings of six European nations, and additionally
warning that the United Kingdom may also face downgrades.37
The downgrades continued throughout 2012 as major banks
began to boost their cash reserves.38
Compared to the holistic purview of ratings, a liquidity approach considers discrete events that cause a company or a
country to be unable to meet its financial obligations. Such situations may be created when “cheap credit, and not valueadded products, drives a nation’s economy or a company’s production.”39 When market forces, trade partners, or critical decisions withdraw, or even simply interrupt, the means of immediate liquidity, debt becomes distressed due to a lack of shortterm viability. For example, before investment banks changed
structures to borrow directly from the U.S. Federal Reserve,
Bear Stearns became distressed (and ultimately deceased)
when counter-parties withdrew all forms of liquidity.40
34. See Claire A. Hill, Rating Agencies Behaving Badly: The Case of Enron,
35 CONN. L. REV. 1145, 1145–46 (2003).
35. Cf. Randall D. Guynn, The Global Financial Crisis and Proposed Regulatory Reform, 2010 BYU L. REV. 421, 472–73 (2010) (discussing the political
battle over reforming the ratings process).
36. Drew FitzGerald & Stephen L. Bernard, Moody’s Warns U.K. on Outlook, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2012, at A8; David Gauthier-Villars & Charles
Forelle, Europe Hit by Downgrades, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2012, at A1.
37. FitzGerald & Bernard, supra note 36; Gauthier-Villars & Forelle, supra note 36.
38. E.g., David Enrich, Large European Banks Stash Cash, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 13, 2012, at C1.
39. Wallis Interview, supra note 8.
40. Susanne Craig et. al, Lehman Faces Mounting Pressures, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 10, 2008, at A1.
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The two remaining definitions of distressed require a more
analytical approach. A cost-of-debt approach defines a security
as distressed when the spread between the risk-free rate and
the company’s debt exceeds 1000 basis points.41 The “risk-free
rate” is the rate that investors would expect to earn in a theoretical risk-free environment for a given period, often estimated
to be the yield on U.S. Treasury Bills. According to this approach, the major Eurozone debts would have been nearing distressed levels as early as September 2009.42 The same determination would result under the trading values approach, which
considers the nominal trading value of a security. Typical
hallmarks of financial distress under this approach include a
de minimis equity value or debt trading at a significant discount.43 Under this definition, Greece’s sovereign debt would
have qualified as distressed in December 2011 because estimated recovery for bondholders was thirty-two cents on the euro.44
C. Examples of Distressed Deals Already Made in the Eurozone
The traditional definitions of distressed debt demonstrate
that the Eurozone was likely distressed for a significant period
before the rating agencies issued downgrades.45 During this
unannounced period of distress, several lucrative transactions
closed. On one such occasion, Ireland’s most wealthy citizen,
Sean Quinn, chose to invest heavily in the Anglo Irish Bank
41. MOYER, supra note 10, at 7 (citing Jean Helwege & Paul Kleiman, Understanding Aggregate Default Rates of High Yield Bonds, CURRENT ISSUES
ECO. & FIN., May 1996, at 1, 5–6 (1996)).
42. See Richard Barley, Europe Dodges Worst of Ratings Mess, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 4, 2009, at C10. The 10-Year T-Bill rate in September 2009 was between 3% and 3.5%, which would mean that distressed debt levels started at
an approximately 13% yield. See Daily Treasury Bill Rates, U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chartcenter/interest-rates/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (select
“Daily Treasury Bill Rates” and use drop-down lists to select “2009”).
43. MOYER, supra note 10, at 7. A typical equity marker would be a stock
trading for less than US$1 per share, and a typical debt indicator would be a
discount of 40% or greater from face value. Id.
44. See Greece Government Bond 10Y, TRADING ECONOMICS,
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/government-bond-yield (last visited
Apr. 24, 2013).
45. See Barley, supra note 42; Gauthier-Villars & Forelle, supra note 36.
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Corporation (“Irish Bank”).46 After the situation failed to improve, Mr. Quinn was left bankrupt,47 and a number of international investors purchased Irish Bank’s distressed assets.48
Kennedy Wilson, a global real estate investment and services
firm based in the United States, purchased €1.6 billion of distressed residential housing developments from Bank of Ireland’s portfolio.49 U.S.-based State Street Global Advisors increased its assets under management by US$36 billion when it
purchased Bank of Ireland Asset Management for €57 million.50 Similarly, U.S.-based real estate giant CB Richard Ellis
purchased ING Real Estate Investment Management from the
ING Group of the Netherlands.51
Even for buyers within the Eurozone, distressed deals for
state-owned assets created new opportunities. In June 2011,
Germany-based Deutsche Telekom AG increased its ownership
in Greece’s Hellenic Telecommunications Organization SA by
10% for €400 (approximately US$590 million).52 In comparison,
Deutsch Telekom had spent nearly €4 billion since 2008 to acquire its existing 30% stake.53 Likewise, Fraport AG, a German
company that owns or manages twelve airports around the
world, announced interest in acquiring a 55% stake in Athens
International Airport.54 Further, Czech power company CEZ
AS indicated in April 2011 its interest in acquiring an equity
position in Greece’s largest power supplier, Public Power Corp.,
as Greek officials sought to reduce debt levels through stateowned asset sales.55
46. Colm Heatley & Finbarr Flynn, Former Irish Billionaire Sean Quinn
(Jan.
16,
2012),
Declared
Bankrupt,
BLOOMBERG
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-16/former-irish-billionaire-seanquinn-declared-bankrupt-1-.html.
47. Id.
48. See SPECIAL REPORT: End of an Eire, PERE MAG., July–Aug. 2011.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. In fairness to the analysis presented in Part III(B), CBRE likely requires only a traditional, and not extraterritorial, application of 11 U.S.C. §
541 for U.S. bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
52. Christopher Lawton & Laura Stevens, Bargain Hunting in Greece,
WALL ST. J., June 7, 2011, at B10.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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II. INCENTIVES IN FRAUDULENT TRANSFER LITIGATION AND
HOW SUCH INCENTIVES MAY CAUSE EUROZONE DEALS TO
REPLICATE RECENT HISTORY
A flurry of Eurozone distressed transfers creates a potential
problem for foreign investors if two situations were to occur.
First, the distressed party selling the assets would have to not
survive either the immediate liquidity crisis or the broader
economic rebalancing. This failure may initially take the form
of an out-of-court restructuring, but could later result in a
bankruptcy filing in U.S. courts under Chapters 11 or 15 of the
Code. Second, the crisis that caused the opportunity reverses,
and the market re-prices the asset at non-distressed levels. After such a recovery, the hindsight view of the original transaction appears significantly stilted—as if the distressed buyer
pilfered the spoils of the unwilling seller and stole the crown
jewels.
Although this characterization of the distressed transaction
tends to inflate the original balance of power, such a hindsight
view often leads critics to impugn the actions of the “vulture
investor.”56 Vultures, a pejorative term for distressed purchasers, “are so named because they have a predilection for businesses that are dead or dying. . . . [Vultures are] betting that a
company on its knees will once again stand up and resume
walking.”57 The opinion of two such critics offended by a vulture’s success is particularly important: the now-bankrupt seller and its creditors. Significant rebounds in asset prices may
lead the distressed seller, or the distressed seller’s creditors, to
feel taken advantage of or even cheated. This potential situation may even discourage distressed purchasers from completing out-of-court transactions for fear that this unique form of
“seller’s remorse” will incentivize avoidance actions.58
Fraudulent transfer laws would appear, at least initially, to
allay these reservations.59 The party seeking avoidance must

56.
57.
58.
59.

See HILARY ROSENBERG, THE VULTURE INVESTORS 22 (1992).
Id.
See MOYER, supra note 10, at 201.
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (2006); UNIFORM FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER ACT (UFTA) §§ 4–5 (1984). The UFTA serves as a reasonable proxy
for most states’ fraudulent transfer laws, while 11 U.S.C. § 548 provides the
standard for federal courts.
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show that the consideration exchanged did not constitute “reasonably equivalent value” under an actual, quasi, or constructive fraudulent transfer theory.60 Each of these theories calculates “reasonably equivalent value” as it existed at the time of
the transfer.61 Accordingly, a court must calculate value using
industry valuation practices as of the time of the transfer. Such
an analysis would likely preclude any recovery, even in distressed situations, because comparable transactions would
usually provide a baseline for “reasonably equivalent value.”62
But the potential to recover valuable assets with successful
avoidance actions provides an incentive to test the bounds of
reasonably equivalent value.
The last three economic cycles have presented remarkably
similar iterations of the situation described.63 None is more indicative of the incentives behind avoidance actions than
ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corporation.64 Before becoming what the Fifth Circuit described as “one of the most
successful bankruptcies in the United States in history,”65

60. ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 335 (S.D. Tex.
2008). Actual fraud requires that “the debtor made the transfer or incurred
the obligation . . . with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor
of the debtor.” UFTA § 4(a)(1). The other two theories require no such finding. Quasi-constructive fraud occurs when a transaction makes “the remaining assets of the debtor . . . unreasonably small in relation to the business or
transaction.” UFTA § 4(a)(2)(i). Similarly, constructive fraud requires strict
liability where a transfer is made for less than “reasonably equivalent value”
and is made during or itself causes a debtor’s insolvency. UFTA § 5(a).
61. ASARCO, 396 B.R. at 337.
62. See id. at 355–57.
63. “During the globalization era, [the] . . . three bubbles and bursts . . .
were Reagan’s junk-bond bubble, Clinton’s dot-com bubble, and Bush’s mortgage and housing bubble.” Chih Kwan Chen, The Rise and the SelfDestruction of the Globalization Scheme, FORCASTGLOBALECONOMY.COM § 6
(last
updated
Feb.
16,
2013),
http://forcastglobaleconomy.com/ReviewForecast01/ReviewForecast01.htm.
Describing the events leading to the late 1980s correction, vulture investor
Harry Freund said, “[p]rices had gone up, everybody was rushing into [restructuring], and the values that we were used to were not evident. Everything was just flooded with money, and ignorant money. Summer of 1989
there was an implosion . . . .” ROSENBERG, supra note 56, at 23.
64. See ASARCO, 396 B.R. at 278.
65. ASARCO L.L.C. v. Barclays Capital, Inc., 702 F.3d 250, 256 (5th Cir.
2012) (citations omitted).
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Americas Smelting and Refining Company’s (“ASARCO”) bankruptcy case was perhaps the largest and most complex environmental reorganization to date.66
For much of the twentieth-century, ASARCO was the leading
copper producer in the United States.67 In 2005, faced with
“[l]ow copper prices, labor strikes, environmental liabilities,
asbestos claims,” and significant bond debts from a leveraged
buyout, ASARCO sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in
the Southern District of Texas.68 The centerpiece of the eventual “100-cent plan”69 was ASARCO’s successful fraudulent conveyance claim against its parent corporation, Grupo Mexico,
S.A.B. de C.V. (“Grupo”).70 ASARCO’s bankruptcy counsel,
Baker Botts LLP, brought the avoidance action against Grupo
to recover the “crown jewel” of ASARCO: a controlling equity
interest in the Southern Peru Copper Company (“SPCC”).71
Low copper prices had depressed the value of the SPCC interest in 2001 after Grupo formed a no-asset company, Americas
Mining Corporation (“AMC”), and pursued a leverage buyout of
the interest.72
In short, the SPCC transaction was fraught with complications stemming from ASARCO’s perilous financial condition
and AMC’s/Grupo’s tactics to force a deal. Among these complications were that (1) ASARCO had stopped paying various
creditors and had technically defaulted on its US$450 million
revolver by October 2001;73 (2) Grupo had maneuvered to prevent the advising investment banks from soliciting other offers
66. In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2975882, at *6 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011).
67. Judith Elkin, Recent Cases and Strategies That Impact Distressed
Business Sales: Is it Worth the Headache?, in BUYING AND SELLING
DISTRESSED BUSINESSES, *1, *15 (2010), available at 2010 WL 6425204.
68. Id.
69. A “100-cent” case is the rare case in bankruptcy where creditors receive full payment through the plan of reorganization. John Bittner et al.,
Anatomy of the “100 Cent+” Case, 25 ASS’N INSOLVENCY & RESTRUCTURING
ADVISORS 1, 1 (Aug.–Sept. 2011). ASARCO was one of these rare cases. See In
re ASARCO LLC, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011).
70. ASARCO LLC v. Americas Mining Corp., 396 B.R. 278, 297–300 (S.D.
Tex. 2008).
71. Id. at 297–98, 304.
72. Id. at 302–03.
73. Id. at 305–06.
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for the SPCC equity;74 (3) certain ASARCO board members had
been asked to resign after withdrawing their consent for the
SPCC transaction;75 and (4) valuation opinions from several
investment banks were conflicted on the enterprise value of the
transaction.76 In fact, after one restructuring advisor attempted
to withdraw its fairness opinion, ASARCO’s pre-bankruptcy
restructuring counsel predicted the eventual fraudulent transfer lawsuit.77 Despite the myriad of complications, the SPCC
transaction closed on March 31, 2003.78
During the period starting the day after the SPCC transaction closed until the time of the fraudulent transfer proceeding,
copper prices improved dramatically, rising from approximately US$0.71 per pound to more than US$3.50 per pound.79 The
substantial improvement in copper prices buoyed the estimated
value of the SPCC equity interest from an estimated US$811.4
or US$853 million, to well over US$3 billion.80 Incentivized by
the prospect of recovering the “crown jewel” asset, Baker Botts
brought the fraudulent transfer proceeding to recover the
SPCC interest on behalf of ASARCO’s creditors.81 Following a
four-week bench trial, the district court entered a voluminous,
186-page opinion and order unwinding the SPCC transaction.82
The court concluded that the price paid for the SPCC interest
constituted “reasonably equivalent value,” which defeated the
constructive fraudulent transfer theory,83 but that the SPCC
74. Id. at 308.
75. Id. at 313–14.
76. Id. at 307.
77. Id. at 312–13.
78. Id. at 313.
79. Id. at 303, 357.
80. See id. at 350, 355 (calculations made by author based on figures provided by the court).
81. Id. at 315.
82. Id. at 278–433.
83. Id. at 364. Over a span of forty pages, the court analyzed “reasonably
equivalent value” extensively using three different common valuation methods: (1) Stock Price Valuation, (2) Market Transaction Multiples, and (3) Discounted Cash Flow. Id. at 342. A stock price valuation applies a premium or
discount to the historical trading averages of a public equity, but requires an
efficient market to serve as a viable value indication. Id. at 342–45. Although
the transaction multiple method is a common industry practice, it was not a
good indication of the SPCC equity value because the complexities of the case
eliminated the field of comparable transactions. Id. at 352–57, n.68. The
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transaction was still avoidable as an “actual” fraudulent transfer.84
In addition to the incentive for debtors in avoidance actions,
ASARCO provides an example of the incentive for the counsel
of the debtor in possession to bring avoidance proceedings or
take other actions to augment the estate.85 The Fifth Circuit
affords bankruptcy courts the discretion to enhance attorneys’
fees in the rare and exceptional case where counsel accomplishes a substantial recovery for their clients that would not
have otherwise occurred without their efforts.86 Based on the
“significant hurdles” faced and the “rare and extraordinary”
results produced,87 the bankruptcy court in ASARCO awarded
Baker Botts a US$4 million fee enhancement for its successful
avoidance of the SPCC transaction.88 Other firms received simicourt relied on the Discounted Cash Flow analysis, which considers the future cash flows of an investment, to arrive at a valuation and applied a discount rate to arrive at present value. Id. at 357–62.
84. Id. at 386. In addition to the statutory badges, the court considered
suggested badges of fraud, including: (1) pilfering the “crown jewel” asset, (2)
order of payment from proceeds, (3) remaining past due obligations left unpaid, (4) ability to pay other creditors, and (5) competitive bidding and sale to
highest bidder. Id. at 374–78.
85. See In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2974957, *35–37
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011).
86. CRG Partners Grp., L.L.C. v. Neary (In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.), 690
F.3d 650, 652–53 (5th Cir. 2012) (affirming a fee enhancement of 16%); Lawler v. Teofan (In re Lawler), 807 F.2d 1207, 1213–14 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming
fee enhancement at factor of 1.7 over the lodestar); Rose Pass Mines, Inc. v.
Howard, 615 F.2d 1088, 1092 (5th Cir. 1980) (enhancing fees by 16%); Wolf v.
Frank, 555 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1977) (enhancing fees by 33%); but cf.
Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1676–77 (2010) (denying
“arbitrary” fee enhancement of 75% in an action brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983). The bankruptcy court in ASARCO distinguished Perdue, saying that
“a civil-rights case that does not even contain the word ‘bankruptcy’” should
not displace “decades of established bankruptcy jurisprudence.” In re
ASARCO, 2011 WL 2974957, at *36. The Fifth Circuit likewise rejected Perdue as an absolute bar to fee enhancements in bankruptcy, noting in another
matter in the ASARCO case that “enhancements are possible in situations
not delineated by Perdue.” Pilgrim’s Pride, 690 F.3d at 664.
87. In re ASARCO, 2011 WL 2974957, at *4, *7.
88. Id. at *37. Baker Botts’ total fees for the ASARCO case, including the
fee enhancement, exceeded US$117 million. Id. at *41. The court calculated
the fee enhancement by applying a 10% increase to the 58,781.2 hours alone
that Baker Botts’ attorneys spent on the SPCC fraudulent transfer litigation.
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lar fee enhancements for asbestos litigation in which claimants
received a settlement of almost US$1 billion.89 These fee enhancements were upheld by the district court90 and were pending a decision on appeal to the Fifth Circuit at the time of publication.91
ASARCO demonstrates that foreigners facing litigation in
U.S. courts may risk losing their sweetheart deal and having
damages or fee enhancements assessed.92 Depending on the
assets exchanged in distressed Eurozone transactions, improvements in the broader economic climate or even intermittent liquidity fixes may create similar financial incentives as
rising copper prices did in ASARCO. Likewise, the size of the
transactions discussed in ASARCO, presumably comparable to
those in the Eurozone, provide significant incentives for debtors and their creditors to challenge the two and half hurdles.
III. THE TWO AND A HALF HURDLES TO U.S. ADJUDICATION OF
FOREIGN FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS
Distressed Eurozone opportunities, counterparty failures,
and improving economics may all serve to create incentives
similar to those in ASARCO to bring avoidance actions. The
opportunity appears to be ripe, but the question remains: Can
U.S. bankruptcy courts exercise both jurisdiction and constitutional authority to act? First, litigants must demonstrate that
the failures of the 2005 Amendments to the Code, which added
Chapter 15, allow courts to shun cooperation in cross-border

Id. at *37 n.103. The debtor in possession originally approved a fee enhancement for Baker Botts of US$22.64 million, but the bankruptcy court reduced
the award upon challenge of the reorganized debtor. Sealed Brief for Baker
Botts, LLP at 35, ASARCO LLC v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer,
PC (In re ASARCO LLC), No. 12-40997 (5th Cir. Feb. 19, 2013).
89. In re ASARCO LLC, No. 05-21207, 2011 WL 2975882, at *12–13
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 20, 2011).
90. ASARCO LLC v. Baker Botts, LLP (In re ASARCO LLC), 477 B.R. 661,
665 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Largest Fee Enhancement in U.S. Bankruptcy History
BOTTS
(Oct.
24,
Affirmed
on
Appeal,
BAKER
2012), http://www.bakerbotts.com/largest-fee-enhancement-in-us-bankruptcyhistory-affirmed-on-appeal-10-24-2012/.
91. See ASARCO LLC v. Jordan Hyden Womble Culbreth & Holzer, PC (In
re ASARCO LLC), No. 12-40997 (5th Cir. filed Sept. 24, 2012).
92. See In re ASARCO, 2011 WL 2975882, *12–13.
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insolvencies, contrary to statutory guidance.93 Empirical evidence suggests this argument creates only a “half hurdle.”94
After they prove that Chapter 15 does not preclude U.S. adjudication, litigants must prove that the Code otherwise allows
courts to reach foreign transactions. A split over whether bankruptcy courts may apply the Code extraterritorially has developed since the addition of Chapter 15 in 2005.95 As of yet, the
Supreme Court has denied the opportunity to settle the dispute.96 Thus, the extraterritoriality hurdle would require carefully choosing the proper forum and then successfully arguing
that U.S. courts’ jurisdiction under the Code extends beyond
the territorial borders of the United States.
The final hurdle to adjudication in U.S. bankruptcy courts is
whether these courts have constitutional authority to determine fraudulent transfer actions of foreign property. The Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Stern v. Marshall97 revived a
formalist approach to the separation of powers regarding bankruptcy courts’ constitutional authority.98 While litigants have
struggled to reconcile its impact on domestic fraudulent trans-

93. See 11 U.S.C. § 1525 (2006).
94. See Jeremy Leong, Is Chapter 15 Universalist or Territorialist? Empirical Evidence from United States Bankruptcy Court Cases, EXPRESSO 25
(2010),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=jeremy_le
ong (characterizing Chapter 15 as a hypocritical “setback rather than a step
forward for international cooperation in insolvency law”).
95. Compare French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 151–52
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006) (applying § 541(a) and § 547 internationally), with Barclay v. Swiss Fin. Corp. (In re Bankr. Estate of Midland Euro Exch. Inc.), 347 B.R. 708, 717–18 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006) (refusing
to apply § 541(a) and § 548 internationally).
96. See French, 549 U.S. at 815.
97. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
98. See Tim S. Springer, Supreme Court’s Answer to the Anna Nicole Smith
Saga in Stern v. Marshall Leaves Bankruptcy World Asking Questions,
BEHIND THE BENCH (Ass’n Bankr. Jud. Assistants), Sept. 2011, at 3 [hereinafter Springer, Supreme Court’s Answer]. See generally Omar J. Alaniz, Navigating Through the Post-Stern World: A Comprehensive Survey of All Cases
Meaningfully Discussing Stern v. Marshall (Nov. 8–9, 2012) [hereinafter Alaniz, Navigating Through the Post-Stern World] (presentation at 31st Annual
Jay
L.
Westbrook
Bankruptcy
Conference),
available
at
http://utcle.org/elibrary/get-asset-file/asset_file_id/44751/preview/1.
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fer actions,99 Stern also provides the final hurdle for U.S. bankruptcy courts to reach foreign transactions without offending
Article III.
A. The Half Hurdle of Chapter 15 of Title 11.
Congress created the first hurdle to U.S. courts’ jurisdiction
with the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).100 Among other
significant changes to the Code, BAPCPA added the muchanticipated Chapter 15, which created new protocols for handling cross-border insolvency cases.101 Chapter 15 integrated
many of the changes proposed by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) in its Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.102 UNCITRAL’s Model Law
was intended to encourage a universalist approach to crossboard insolvencies and to promote continuity and predictability
between courts in different countries.103
Before BAPCPA’s passage, many U.S. bankruptcy scholars
argued that international bankruptcies should not incorporate
a universalist principle.104 Professor Lynn LoPucki has advocated for a territorialist approach, which would limit a country’s judicial powers to enforcement only within its territorial
99. See Omar J. Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting the Stern Decision
(Part I), 17 BANKR. LITIG. (A.B.A. Bankr. & Insolvency Litig. Comm.), Feb. 15,
2012,
at
21–34,
available
at
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/winter
2012-survey-interpreting-stern.html [hereinafter Alaniz, A Survey of Cases
Interpreting the Stern Decision] (listing cases with both narrow and expansive views of Stern).
100. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, §§ 801–02, 119 Stat. 23, 134–46.
101. Id.
102. See Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 52/158, Annex, art. 10,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998).
103. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 1525 (2006) (“[T]he court shall cooperate to the maximum extent possible with a foreign court . . . .”). For further discussion of
UNCITRAL’s Model Law and its application in U.S. bankruptcies, see Timothy S. Springer, Note, Paved with Good Intentions: Creditors Face a New
Roadblock to Recovery in Mexican Bankruptcies, 18 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 83,
90–93 (2012) [hereinafter Springer, Paved with Good Intentions].
104. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in
International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2216–17 (2000).
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borders.105 While supporting a theory of universalism, another
prominent U.S. bankruptcy scholar, Professor Jay L. Westbrook, has acknowledged that “it seems unrealistic to think
that universalism will be accepted absent roughly similar
laws.”106 UNCITRAL’s Model Law would appear to address
Professor Westbrook’s later qualification by creating harmonious laws among different territorial jurisdictions. But to affect
a truly universalist change, all jurisdictions that might be
forced to cooperate by cross-border insolvencies must have first
adopted either the Model Law or laws otherwise comparable.107
As of January 2012, only nineteen countries have adopted the
Model Law, with China and India conspicuously absent from
the list.108
The United States has begun harmonizing its bankruptcy
procedures with other international jurisdictions,109 but Chapter 15 does not provide a clear answer to U.S. courts’ ability to
reach distressed Eurozone transactions. BAPCPA and Chapter
15 improved U.S. recognition of proceedings and the ability of
U.S. courts to apply foreign law to U.S. proceedings.110 But
“neither Chapter 15 nor any other part of the Code extensively
covers the opposite question—the degree to which U.S. courts
can apply U.S. bankruptcy provisions abroad.”111
Empirical evidence suggests that Chapter 15 may not be “as
universalist as its proponents claim it to be.”112 In fact, the evidence suggests that Chapter 15 may be an ineffective solution
“to resolve conflicting priority rules between the United States
and foreign proceedings.”113 In one sense, “Chapter 15 . . . does
not significantly further cooperation because it applies only to
105. Id.
106. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 485 (1991).
107. See id.
108. Status: 1997—UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,
UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [UNCITRAL],
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_stat
us.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
109. See Springer, Paved with Good Intentions, supra note 103, at 90.
110. See Developments in the Law: VII. Chapter 15 and Cross-Border Bankruptcy, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1292, 1293 (2011).
111. Id.
112. Leong, supra note 94, at 8.
113. Id. at 9.
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debtors already subject to a foreign proceeding.”114 Chapter 15
also requires that a U.S. court determine whether its case is
ancillary to a “foreign main proceeding,”115 which the Code defines as “a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the
debtor has the center of its main interests.”116 U.S. courts have
“recognized foreign proceedings in almost every Chapter 15
case” since BAPCPA’s passage in 2005,117 but empirical data
indicates the courts have still withheld jurisdiction over some
assets even after recognition in a vast majority of cases—77.3%
to be precise.118 In only 9.1% of cases did the U.S. court entrust
to foreign courts all distribution of estate assets where U.S.
creditors were at stake.119
The Fifth Circuit recently affirmed one example of a U.S.
bankruptcy court applying U.S. law in contradiction to foreign
law. The bankruptcy court in In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. refused
to enforce a confirmed concurso plan from a Mexican court.120
The Mexican plan would have paid equity classes before more
senior debt classes—a clear violation of the Absolute Priority
Rule121—and released from claims by Vitro’s creditors several
third party subsidiaries in the United States that were not a
part of the bankruptcy case.122 In affirming the bankruptcy

114. Developments in the Law, supra note 110, at 1300.
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 1515 (2006) (outlining process to apply for recognition
of Foreign Main Proceeding).
116. Id. § 1502(4).
117. Leong, supra note 94, at 7.
118. Id. at 8, 14–15, fig.1. The 77.3% figure comes from two categories.
First, Leong’s findings show U.S. “courts granted entrustment in only 45.5%
of cases where foreign proceedings were recognized.” Id. at 7. Second, “[w]hen
such entrustment was granted, 31.8% of cases were accompanied by qualifying factors,” which included imposing U.S. priority laws or requiring assurances such priority distribution schemes would be followed. Id. at 1.
119. Id. at 14.
120. See Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. v. ACP Master, Ltd. (In re Vitro, S.A.B. de
C.V.), 473 B.R. 117, 133 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Ad Hoc
Group of Noteholders v. Vitro S.A.B. de CV, 701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012).
121. The Absolute Priority Rule requires that claimants with higher priority in a Chapter 11 case must be paid in full before claimants with junior priority can be paid in a plan of reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(i)–(ii)
(2006).
122. See Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., 473 B.R. at 131–33.
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court’s denial of confirmation,123 the Fifth Circuit has provided
an example of U.S. courts applying U.S. law and shunning foreign law.
The empirical and substantive evidence of U.S. courts retaining control illustrate the inability of Chapter 15 to address
whether U.S. courts can apply U.S. bankruptcy laws extraterritorially. Even in situations where a Eurozone debtor is subject
to a foreign proceeding, the current trend since BAPCPA’s passage indicates that U.S. courts would not willingly part with
jurisdiction without some baseline qualifications.124 Where no
such proceeding exists, litigants in future avoidance actions
involving Eurozone distressed assets will therefore face only a
“half” hurdle to convincing a U.S. court to apply jurisdiction in
light of Chapter 15. But litigants must subsequently address
the more daunting hurdle—explaining the statutory and constitutional authority for extraterritorial jurisdiction in bankruptcy courts amidst the confusion surrounding questions left
unanswered by Chapter 15.
B. The U.S. Circuit Split Over the Extraterritorial Application
of Title 11
Following the passage of BAPCPA and Chapter 15, U.S.
courts have maintained the ability to apply U.S. law to issues
involving foreign-based property. Courts are generally faced
with two questions before they are able to apply U.S. law outside of its territorial borders: (1) Can the statute be applied extraterritorially, and (2) Does such an application violate principles of international comity?125 For U.S. courts to reach distressed Eurozone transactions, litigants must prove both that
Congress intended for the federal law to apply extraterritorially and that the intrusion into international affairs does not violate comity between U.S. law and Eurozone law.126
123. Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders, 701 F.3d at 1069. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the grounds that “the Bankruptcy Code precludes non-consensual,
non-debtor releases,” and thus did not reach the question of whether the concurso plan “would be manifestly contrary to the fundamental public policy of
the United States.” Id.
124. See id.
125. French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 149 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006).
126. See id.
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1. Analysis of Statutory Jurisdiction
It is well settled that “Congress has the authority to enforce
its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United
States.”127 In addition, it is presumed that “when it desires to
do so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the
jurisdictional reach of a statute.”128 A presumption thus exists
“that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears,
is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.”129 This presumption may be overcome by some
“clearly expressed purpose” to apply the law extraterritorially,130 demonstrated by the three-factor test the Supreme Court
announced in Foley Brothers, Inc. v. Filardo.131 This test provides that the courts must review the statutory language, the
statute’s legislative history, and any administrative interpretations of the statute.132
Section 541 of the Code defines what property and interests
belonging to a debtor constitute the bankruptcy estate over
which the court has custody.133 Applying the Foley Brothers factors, the operative language of § 541 provides that as of the
commencement of a case under Title 11, the estate “is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by
whomever held.”134 Congress amended § 70a of the Bankruptcy
Act, the predecessor of § 541, in 1952 to include the phrase
“wherever located.”135 The House Report connected with the
amendment explained that the phrase makes “clear that a
trustee in bankruptcy is vested with the title of the bankruptcy
in property which is located without, as well as within, the

127. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284–85 (1949)).
128. Id. at 258 (quoting Argentine Republic v. Amerado Hess Shipping
Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989)).
129. Id. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 285).
130. Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 286.
131. Id. at 285–88.
132. Id.
133. See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006).
134. Id. § 541(a) (emphasis added).
135. See Frank R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy Legislation of 1962, 4 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 241, 241, 247 (1963) (citing Pub. L. No. 82-456, 66 Stat. 420,
429–30 (1952)), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol4/iss2/1.
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United States.”136 Legislative reports from the 1978 reforms
give less specific guidance, seemingly incorporating by reference all property included under § 70a of the Bankruptcy
Act.137 Congress’s failure to retreat from the 1952 report in either 1972 or any of the subsequent amendments would appear
to indicate a tacit adoption. The third Foley Brothers factor
does not apply in a § 541 analysis because no agency interpretations are available.138
Despite the apparent extraterritorial application of § 541 using the Foley Brothers factors, courts remain split as to whether § 541 may apply extraterritorially to incorporate foreignbased property.139 The dispute centers around whether the
widely recognized extraterritorial application of § 541 also includes the trustee’s avoidance powers under § 548.140 The academic community has articulated eloquent arguments for both
sides of the debate.141 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not

136. H.R. REP. NO. 82-2320, at 15 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1960, 1976 (emphasis added).
137. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6323.
138. T. Brandon Welch, The Territorial Avoidance Power of the Bankruptcy
Code, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 553, 553 (2008).
139. Compare French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 151–52
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006) (applying § 541(a) and § 547 internationally), with Barclay v. Swiss Fin. Corp. (In re Bankr. Estate of Midland Euro Exch. Inc.), 347 B.R. 708, 717–18 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2006) (refusing
to apply § 541(a) and § 548 internationally).
140. See, e.g., Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 996, 999 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding § 541 applies extraterritorially); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co. v. Hanseatic Marine Serv. (In re Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co.), 207 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding the same);
Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(holding the same).
141. Compare Lynn M. LoPucki, supra note 104 (advocating territorialist
approach), and Welch, supra note 138, at 563–65 (also advocating territorialist approach), with Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Avoidance of Pre-Bankruptcy
Transactions in Multinational Bankruptcy Cases, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 899, 915
(2007) (advocating universalist approach), and David M. Green & Walter
Benzija, Spanning the Globe: The Intended Extraterritorial Reach of the
Bankruptcy Code, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 109–10 (2002) (also advocating universalist approach).
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yet spoken, instead rejecting the opportunity to settle the circuit split over the Code’s extraterritorial application.142
As a result, courts remain split over whether the language of
§ 541 incorporates foreign transferred property pre-petition.143
The Fifth Circuit has twice held that the trustee’s strong-arm
powers under Title 11 may be applied extraterritorially
through § 541, either because the estate retains an equitable
interest in fraudulently transferred property,144 or because the
estate regains an equitable interest in fraudulently transferred
property following a § 550 recovery order.145 Although the Fifth
Circuit’s logic has been criticized as circular,146 at least one
court has concluded that because fraudulent transfers involve
transitory law, such actions may be brought wherever personal
jurisdiction has been established.147
2. Analysis of International Comity
In addition to concerns about § 548 importing extraterritoriality from § 541, litigants must also address principles of inter142. French, 440 F.3d 145. It is possible that the Supreme Court has yet to
rule on extraterritoriality in this context for fear that such a ruling would
violate the separation of powers. See Welch, supra note 138, at 559 n.51. Also
of note, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in French before deciding Morrison v. National Bank of Australia, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), a case in which the
Supreme Court “swiftly swept away a half-century of lower courts treating
the issue of extraterritorial reach of the securities law as a question of subject
matter jurisdiction.” Jared L. Kopel et al., Current Topics on Securities Litigation, in 1850 PRACTISING L. INST., CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 365, 391 (2010).
143. Compare Cullen Ctr. Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In re Criswell), 102
F.2d 1411, 1415–16 (5th Cir. 1997), and Am. Nat’l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1273 &
n.7, 1275–76 (5th Cir. 1983), with Welch, supra note 138, at 563 (citing Barclay, 347 B.R. at 718) (“Irrespective of the extraterritorial application of §
541, foreign transferred property is not within the estate.”).
144. See Cullen, 102 F.3d at 1415–16.
145. See MortgageAmerica, 714 F.2d at 1273 & n.7.
146. See Welch, supra note 138, at 563–64 (stating that the argument that
fraudulently transferred property is within bankruptcy court’s in rem authority “simply assumes what it seeks to prove. Without adopting this circular
argument, extraterritorial jurisdiction cannot be premised on notions of domestic jurisdiction”).
147. Diaz-Barba v. Kismet Acquisition, LLC, No. 08CV1446, 2010 WL
2079738, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2010).
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national comity. Courts look to factors such as, (1) the regulations and laws of the potentially conflicting foreign territory;
(2) the connection and economic activities between the parties
and this territory; (3) the likelihood of conflict of laws; and
(4) the foreign territory’s interest in regulating the transaction.148 At least one court has required that an actual conflict
between foreign and domestic law exist in order to violate international comity.149 Moreover, Chapter 15 would appear to
settle concerns about international comity and provide statutory cover for courts to reach Eurozone transactions, at least on
its face, especially if the foreign jurisdiction has adopted
UNCINTRAL’s Model Law and embraced universalism.
3. Alternative Options to Overcoming the Extraterritoriality
Hurdle
If litigants are unable to overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality using the Foley Brothers factors, one option
remains—prove that the presumption never arose. First, the
presumption does not arise if the transfer occurred in the United States.150 As many transactions touch several territorial jurisdictions simultaneously, some courts avoid the presumption
if the United States was the “center of gravity.”151 Likewise, the
presumption does not arise if the property recovered was already considered part of the estate, either through an action
under 11 U.S.C. § 549,152 or by a convincing argument extending the inclusion date for the property before the petition
date.153
148. See French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 153 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006) (discussing the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403 (1987)).
149. Diaz-Barba, 2010 WL 2079738, at *11.
150. Id. at *7 (citing Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982,
987 (9th Cir. 2008)).
151. See David B. Stratton, Reflections on the Extraterritorial Application of
the Bankruptcy Code, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2005, at 44, 73 (2005).
152. Diaz-Barba, 2010 WL 2079738, at *4, *10 (determining that no presumption arose because, although transfer occurred post-petition, the transferee was debtor’s alter ego, the transfer applied nunc pro tunc, and the
transferred property was considered part of the estate).
153. See West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care—
Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452, 464 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) (concluding that property transferred during the preference period was effectively property of the
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Litigants may also argue that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not arise in bankruptcy proceedings because
bankruptcy is materially different from other legal contexts
and requires special consideration.154 In French, one judge concurred to emphasize his view that the Supreme Court’s “strong
presumption against extraterritoriality” remained “intact” after
the panel’s decision.155 Judge Wilkinson distinguished prior
precedent because, in the context of anti-discrimination or
hourly wage laws, “ease of administration is not the raison
d’être, and congressional intent for extraterritorial application
is considerably less clear.”156 As a result, litigants must argue
that bankruptcy should be considered separately, and not be
grounds “to set forth general pronouncements on extraterritoriality.”157
Finally, litigants seeking to reach Eurozone transactions may
be able to use the Affiliate Rule to file in a circuit willing to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially. This rule allows a company to file either in the jurisdiction of its principal place of business,158 or in that of an affiliated company.159 Of course, the
rule cannot be used offensively to establish business in a favorable jurisdiction solely for the purpose of filing bankruptcy,160
but it “is the rare case, indeed, in which a debtor’s business
does not have some international aspect.”161 In the age of global
business operations, the Affiliate Rule casts a wide-enough net
to reach most major U.S. jurisdictions for bankruptcy filings.
If successful in overcoming the hurdles of Chapter 15 and extraterritoriality, litigants will have gained access to, at the
minimum, U.S. district courts. But the final hurdle will deter-

estate, despite the transaction occurring as much as a year before bankruptcy
in some cases).
154. French v. Liebmann (In re French), 440 F.3d 145, 154–55 (4th Cir.
2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 815 (2006) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 155.
156. Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2006).
159. Id. § 1408(2).
160. See In re Reichmann Petroleum Corp., 364 B.R. 916, 921 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 2007) (denying venue transfer where assets were acquired solely for
purposes of manipulating venue).
161. Stratton, supra note 151, at 44 (emphasis added).
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mine if litigants can obtain expedited treatment under the
“rocket dockets” of U.S. bankruptcy courts.
C. Questions of Bankruptcy Courts’ Constitutional Authority
after Stern v. Marshall
Once a litigant convinces a court to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially, the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in
Stern v. Marshall162 may provide yet another constitutional
hurdle. The Stern Court made clear that not every proceeding
within a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is necessarily within
its constitutional reach.163 In fact, although Stern considers the
authority of bankruptcy courts, the decision “is not really a
bankruptcy decision at all; it is a constitutional separation of
powers decision.”164
Article III of the U.S. Constitution provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish.”165 Bankruptcy judges are
not Article III judges; they lack the hallmark characteristics of
life tenure and salary protection.166 Instead, bankruptcy judges’
powers come from Article I of the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”167 As a result, bankruptcy courts exercising the judicial power of the
United States would constitute one branch of the government
aggrandizing its powers to the detriment of another branch,
violating the separation of powers.168 Although money and job
security may appear to be insignificant reasons for such a dis-

162. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
163. See id. at 2608.
164. George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Act’s Summary/Plenary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC., no. 1, Jan. 2012, at 1.
165. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
166. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600–01.
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
168. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 974 (1983) (rejecting the one-house
veto as unconstitutional because it aggrandized the powers of the legislative
branch to the detriment of the executive branch, thus violating the separation of powers).
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tinction, the Framers of the Constitution recognized that these
two features protect the courts from tyranny.169
The Stern Court held a non-Article III court violated the separation of powers by entering a final order in a common law
case reserved for Article III courts.170 Although the holding in
Stern was self-limiting,171 “a maelstrom of opinions and articles
have been written about the scope of Stern, ranging in tone
from ‘much ado about nothing’ to ‘the end of the bankruptcy
world as we know it.’”172 Caught squarely in the middle is
whether bankruptcy courts have authority to enter final orders
in fraudulent transfer actions.
1. Statutory Framework for Bankruptcy Courts’ Jurisdiction
To explain the implications of Stern, some discussion of the
authority allocation between district courts and bankruptcy
courts is necessary. Article I of the U.S. Constitution empowers
Congress to create laws regarding the debtor-creditor relationship in bankruptcy.173 Congress exercised its Article I powers in
1978 to replace the then-existing Bankruptcy Act with the present Bankruptcy Code.174 Like other federal courts, bankruptcy
courts’ jurisdiction is therefore “grounded in, and limited by,
statute.”175 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Northern
Pipeline v. Marathon,176 Congress revisited the bankruptcy al-

169. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
170. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609.
171. See id. at 2620 (“We conclude today that Congress, in one isolated respect, exceeded” its authority.) (emphasis added); see also In re Salander
O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 115–16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Stern is
replete with language emphasizing that this ruling should be limited to the
unique circumstances of that case . . . .”).
172. BankUnited Fin. Corp. v. FDIC (In re BankUnited Fin. Corp.), 462
B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
174. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006).
175. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307 (1995).
176. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70
(1982) (rejecting Congress’s inclusion of common law matters within bankruptcy court’s plenary powers).
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location scheme and restructured jurisdictional allocations under Title 28.177
Under the revised allocation framework, federal district
courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction for all cases arising under Title 11.178 Section 157(a) provides statutory authority for district courts to refer jurisdiction to the bankruptcy
courts for those cases falling “under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case
under title 11.”179 By way of referral, bankruptcy courts have in
rem authority over “all the property, wherever located, of the
debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of
the estate.”180 District courts supervise referrals with the ability to withdraw the reference at any time by their own motions.181
Even looking beyond the plain language of the referral statute, the Supreme Court has recognized that “Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts
so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with all
matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.”182 Before her
appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor defended this principle and noted that the Supreme Court and other
courts “have broadly construed the jurisdictional grant in [the
1984 Act].”183 Moreover, the express “language of § 1334(b)
must be read to give district courts (and bankruptcy courts under § 157(a)) jurisdiction over more than simple proceedings
involving the property of the debtor or the estate.”184
Congress allocated original jurisdiction to bankruptcy courts
to hear and determine proceedings concerning estate property
177. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984) (codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1329 and scattered sections of Titles 26 and 28 of the U.S. Code).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) (2006).
179. Id. § 157(a) (emphasis added).
180. Id. § 1334(e). See also Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541
U.S. 440, 447–48 (2004) (“Bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction over
a debtor’s property, wherever located, and over the estate.”).
181. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d).
182. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc.
v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)).
183. Universal Oil Ltd. v. Allfirst Bank (In re Millenium Seacarriers, Inc.),
419 F.3d 83, 99 (2d Cir. 2005).
184. Celotex, 514 U.S. at 308.
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that arise in a bankruptcy case or under Title 11.185 “Arising
in” jurisdiction pertains to matters that could only arise in a
case under Title 11.186 By comparison, “arising under” jurisdiction includes proceedings created by Title 11.187 Taken together, actions “arising in” or “arising under” comprise core proceedings within bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction.188 Bankruptcy
courts may hear and determine these core matters and enter
final orders, which are subject to appellate review by the district court under a “clearly erroneous” standard of review.189
2. Why Stern Creates a Problem for the Current Framework
Instead of “arising in” or “arising under” jurisdiction, Stern
involved only the third type of original bankruptcy court jurisdiction under § 157(a): proceedings “related to” the bankruptcy.190 A proceeding invokes “related to” jurisdiction when the
“action is related to bankruptcy [in that] the outcome could alter the debtor’s rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action.”191 Put simply, “a civil proceeding is related to a [T]itle 11
case if the action’s outcome might have any conceivable effect
on the bankrupt estate.”192 “Related to” jurisdiction stands on
an opposite edge of the jurisdictional canyon from core proceedings allocated under § 157(b)(1). Proceedings invoking only “related to”—and not “arising in” or “arising under”—jurisdiction
are not core proceedings.193 Absent consent of the parties under
§ 157(c)(2), the statute at most authorizes bankruptcy courts in
“related to” proceedings to submit proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law to the district court for a de novo review.194
185. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(b), 157(b)(1), 157(b)(2)(A).
186. See Wilborn v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re Wilborn), 609 F.3d 748, 752
(5th Cir. 2010).
187. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1); Schatz v. Chase Home Fin. (In re Schatz), 452
B.R. 544, 551 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2011).
188. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2604–05 (2011).
189. See id. at 2604 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 158; BANKR. R. PROC. 8013).
190. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605.
191. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n.6 (1995) (quoting Pacor,
Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)).
192. Parmalat Capital Fin. Ltd. v. Bank of Am. Corp., 639 F.3d 572, 579 (2d
Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. Cf. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605 (defining core proceedings as “arising in”
or “arising under” Title 11).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
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Stern involved a dispute over a considerable inheritance, and
a widow’s attempt to recover in bankruptcy court for a tort
claim against her late husband’s son.195 The tort claim was not
predicated on the bankruptcy, meaning it neither arose nor
was it tried exclusively in connection with a case under Title
11.196 Therefore, because of the conceivable effect on the estate,
§ 157(c) should have allocated jurisdiction over the purely
state-law counterclaim under the “related to” or non-core
framework.197 But because Congress included counterclaims by
the estate in the non-exhaustive list of core proceedings in the
1984 Act,198 the bankruptcy court relied on this list to enter a
final order.199
The Stern Court rejected the defunct label under
§ 157(b)(2)(C) for state law counterclaims as core proceedings,
but declared only this narrow sub-provision to be unconstitutional.200 Absent consent, which the Court determined was not
given for the counterclaim,201 the bankruptcy court’s only authority under the § 157 allocation scheme was to submit proposed findings to the district court.202 Even assuming that the
Court’s holding in Stern affected proceedings that did not invoke solely “related to” jurisdiction, a bankruptcy court may
still hear and determine such matters after Stern with the consent of the parties.203 Chief Justice Roberts defined “core proceedings [as] those that arise in a bankruptcy case or under Title 11.”204 Thus the Court is referring to the only remaining
original bankruptcy jurisdiction—”related to”—when it states,
“parties may consent to entry of final judgment by [a] bankruptcy judge in non-core case.”205 The Court neither rejected
195. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
196. Id. at 2618; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(a).
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
198. Id. § 157(b)(2)(C); Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
199. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2602.
200. See id. at 2608, 2620.
201. See id. at 2614.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
203. E.g., Mercury Cos. v. FNF Sec. Acquisition, Inc., 460 B.R. 778, 781–83
(D. Colo. 2011); In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, 457 B.R. 692, 699–700
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011).
204. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605.
205. Id. at 2607 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2)).
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any other core proceeding under § 157(b), nor renounced bankruptcy courts’ ability to hear and submit proposals and conclusions under the § 157(c)(1) allocation scheme.206
What the Stern decision has done is to revive arguments over
significant dicta in the decision of Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg.207 The Supreme Court in Granfinanciera held that a
foreign party subjected to a fraudulent transfer action retained
the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because
the proceeding was legal, not equitable, and because it closely
mirrored a common law action.208 Although it decided the case
on Seventh Amendment grounds, the Court indicated that the
fraudulent transfer action was a private and not public right,
despite arising under Title 11.209 The opinion in Granfinanciera
echoed many of the Supreme Court’s earlier concerns in Marathon about non-Article III courts and the scope of public
rights,210 although it specifically rejected any limitation that
would have mandated that the federal government be a party
in all cases involving public rights.211

206. See, e.g., Gecker v. Flynn (In re Emerald Casino, Inc.), 459 B.R. 298,
300 n.1 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (upholding § 157(c)(1)); Adams Nat’l Bank v.
GB Herdon & Assocs., Inc. (In re GB Herdon & Assocs., Inc.), 459 B.R. 148,
160–66 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011) (denying debtor’s motion to reconsider removal
after Stern because debtor had consented under § 157(c)(2)); In re Safety
Harbor Resort & Spa, LLC, 456 B.R. 703, 715 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). But
see Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir. 2012) (determining that bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter judgment for fraud
claims brought by the debtor, reasoning that the creditor’s objection on appeal to bankruptcy court adjudication implicated private rights that could not
be waived by a litigant).
207. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
208. Id. at 46–47, 50.
209. Id. at 56.
210. Compare id. at 53–54 (discussing “whether Article III allows Congress
to assign adjudication of [a common law] cause of action to a non-Article III
tribunal”), with N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S.
50, 64–67 (1982) (discussing the same issue).
211. Compare Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53–54, with Stern v. Marshall,
131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620–21 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that he
would require the government to be a party for a fraudulent transfer to fit
within the public rights exception).
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3. How Lowers Courts Are Grappling with Stern’s Implications
This revival of Granfinanciera, along with the maelstrom
surrounding Stern, has created considerable consternation
among bankruptcy courts and practitioners trying to grapple
with its implications.212 In addressing Stern, lower courts of all
levels have fallen into either the narrow, neutral, or expansive
interpretive camps.213 Despite the self-limiting holding, one
commentator advocating for an expansive view of Stern astutely summarized his camp’s general sentiment:
“Justice Breyer may not have been able to command a majority of the court and thus be ‘constitutionally correct,’ but he
has definitely been right about one thing: Justice Roberts’s
statement that as a ‘practical matter’ the Stern v. Marshall
decision ‘does not change all that much’ was either tongue-incheek or decidedly incorrect.”214

Within the context of fraudulent transfers brought under the
Code, the expansive camp may have an argument that the
progeny of Marathon, Granfinanciera, and Stern preclude adjudication in bankruptcy courts.215
212. See Alaniz, Navigating Through the Post-Stern World, supra note 98,
at 2–3; Springer, Supreme Court’s Answer, supra note 98, at 1.
213. As of April 18, 2013, 1089 cases have cited Stern, including 480 discussing the decision. Of these 480 cases, 216 fall within the “narrow” camp,
145 within the “expansive” camp, and 119 remain “neutral.” See Shepard’s®
Report for Stern v. Marshall, LEXIS (Dec. 26, 2012), http://advance.lexis.com
(search “131 S. Ct. 2594”; click “Shepardize®” button; then select “Citing Decisions” tab and display by “Grid”). For a detailed case chart analyzing cases
that discuss Stern in a “meaningful way” from September 1, 2011 through
October 15, 2012, see chart accompanying Alaniz, A Survey of Cases Interpreting
the
Stern
Decision,
supra
note
99,
available
at
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/bankruptcy/articles/winter
2012-survey-interpreting-stern-chart.pdf.
214. Kuney, supra note 164, at 6 (emphasis added). Although the facts of
Stern were limited to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C), the decision has broad implications on the other proceedings included in the non-exhaustive list under
§ 157(b)(2), including fraudulent conveyances. See id.
215. Compare Heller Ehrman LLP v. Arnold & Porter LLP (In re Heller
Ehrman LLP), 464 B.R. 348, 360 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding bankruptcy court
could not determine § 544 or § 548 proceeding), and McCarthy v. Wells Fargo
Bank (In re El Atari), No. 1:11cv1090, 2011 WL 5828013, at *4–5 (E.D. Va.
Nov. 18, 2011) (holding bankruptcy court could not determine § 548 proceeding), with Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 187 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (bankruptcy court could determine both § 544(b) and § 548
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Several circuits have addressed Stern issues in bankruptcy
and fraudulent transfer contexts.216 The Fifth Circuit held that
Stern does not affect the jurisdictional allocation for magistrate
courts,217 and later the circuit reemphasized its reasoning in a
bankruptcy context.218 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit rejected bankruptcy courts’ authority in an “arising in” proceeding
claims); Mercury Cos. v. FNF Sec. Acquisition, Inc., 460 B.R. 778, 783–84 (D.
Colo. 2011) (bankruptcy court could determine only § 548 claims); and Goldstein v. Eby-Brown, Inc. (In re Universal Mktg., Inc.), 459 B.R. 573, 580
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (bankruptcy court could determine § 544 and § 549
claims).
216. See, e.g., Exclusive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham
Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 561–65 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding “bankruptcy
courts ha[d] [constitutional] authority [only] to hear and enter proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in . . . fraudulent conveyance” claims
against non-creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) because such claims did not
fall within the public rights exception); Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910,
920–23 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter final judgment on state law fraud claims, but had authority
to enter order disallowing and discharging the claims); Onkyo Eur. Elecs.
GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In re Global Technovations Inc.), 694
F.3d 705 (6th Cir. 2012) (determining that bankruptcy court had constitutional authority to rule on fraudulent transfer action and good faith transferee defense under state law where defendants had filed a proof of claim); Lovald v. Falzerano (In re Falzerano), 686 F.3d 885, 887 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012) (declining to address whether Stern prevented bankruptcy court from issuing
final order in turnover adversary proceeding); Pfizer Inc. v. Law Offices of
Peter G. Angelos (In re Quigley Co.), 676 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding
bankruptcy court had jurisdiction and constitutional authority to issue injunction over asbestos-related suits pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)); DiVittorio v. HSBC Bank USA, NA (In re DiVittorio), 670 F.3d 273 (1st Cir. 2012)
(concluding Stern did not affect constitutional authority of bankruptcy court
to render decision in adversary proceeding involving failure to state a claim
and waiver of rights under a loan agreement); Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care,
Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding bankruptcy court did
not have constitutional authority to render final judgment in adversary proceeding for state law claims of improper medical patient disclosure because
claims involved private rights).
217. See Technical Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp.,
673 F.3d 399, 409 (5th Cir. 2012). The statute allocating authority for magistrate courts is so similar to 28 U.S.C. § 157 in its application that a constitutional decision on one is often viewed as affecting the other. See Kuney, supra
note 164, at 8; Alaniz, Navigating Through the Post-Stern World, supra note
98, at 20–22.
218. See CRG Partners Group, LLC v. Neary (In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp.),
690 F.3d 650, 666–67 (5th Cir. 2012).
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seeking damages provided for by a state statute regarding the
disclosures of confidential medical records.219 And the Ninth
Circuit recently issued an expansive reading of Stern, holding
that a fraudulent conveyance claim against a non-creditor
brought under 11 U.S.C. § 548 did not fall within the public
rights exception220 and that a bankruptcy court was authorized
only to issue proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.221
If bankruptcy courts can adjudicate fraudulent transfers after Stern, it will likely be through the public rights doctrine, a
judicially created exception to Article III adjudication.222 The
exception is linked to Congress’s Article I legislative powers.223
Congress may except three types of powers from Article III determinations: (1) territorial courts, (2) courts martial, and
(3) cases involving public rights.224 Cases falling within these
three categories “may be removed from [Article] III courts and
delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for
their determination.”225 Although the public rights doctrine
was first applied to a dispute between the government and an
individual,226 it has since been recognized to include actions
where the government is not a formal party.227 Congress may
create rights under a public regulatory scheme that bear “many
of the characteristics of a public right,” even when the right is

219. See Ortiz, 665 F.3d at 915.
220. Exclusive Benefits, 702 F.3d at 561.
221. Id. at 565.
222. But see id. at 564 (rejecting a public rights argument in a § 548 case).
223. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593–94
(1985).
224. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
64–67 (1982). Depending on the desired persuasion, parties may wish to describe public rights as a “doctrine” or “exception.” See id. at 67–69.
225. Id. at 70.
226. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272,
283–85 (1855).
227. See Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 585–86. Although the doctrine continued to be applied in similar procedural settings after Murray’s Lessee, the
inquiry of whether a right is public, rather than private, is “not to mere matters of form but to the substance of what is required.” Id. at 586 (quoting
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932)). Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Stern suggests that he would require the government to be a party for a
fraudulent transfer to fit within the public rights exception. See Stern v.
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620–21 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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asserted between individuals.228 Similarly, Congress may also
“create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated
into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate
for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article
III judiciary.”229 When Congress creates such a statutory right,
“it may also provide that persons seeking to vindicate that
right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right.”230
A plurality of the Stern Court distilled the test for the public
rights exception to find that Congress may allocate adjudication of public rights that “derive[] from a federal regulatory
scheme” or are “integrally related to a particular federal government action.”231 But Article III would serve little “purpose
in the system of checks and balances nor preserve the integrity
of judicial decisionmaking if the other branches of the Federal
Government could confer the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on
entities outside Article III.”232 Accordingly, the Stern Court
tempered any test for public rights with a broader historical
test: “When a suit is made of the stuff of the traditional actions
at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789, and
is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit rests with Article III judges in Article III courts.”233 Thus, jury trial rights attach when suits—
both “the mundane as well as the glamorous”234—involve the
“stuff” of eighteenth-century common law actions, and Congress may not withdraw such suits from Article III judicial
cognizance.235

228. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted).
229. Id. at 594.
230. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 83
(1982).
231. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2613 (citing United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2323 (2011)).
232. Id. at 2609.
233. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting Northern Pipeline,
458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
234. Id. (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 86 n.39 (plurality opinion)).
235. See id. (quoting Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
59 U.S. 272, 284 (1856)).
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4. How the Questions Lingering After Stern Affect Potential
Eurozone Litigation
Bankruptcy courts’ constitutional authority to adjudicate
fraudulent transfer actions to finality after Stern is in doubt
because the Supreme Court itself has characterized fraudulent
conveyance actions as “quintessentially suits at common
law.”236 Parties advocating an expansive approach must argue
that Article III and the Seventh Amendment, as discussed in
Granfinanciera, preserve a jury trial right in these legal actions based in common law. As a result, these parties will argue that Congress may not simply “‘federalize’ and inoculate
against Article III challenge[s]” such traditional common law
proceedings “by enacting [them] as part of the Bankruptcy
Code.”237 Such arguments have been made successfully in the
debate over fraudulent transfers and 11 U.S.C. § 548.238
In comparison, the “narrow” camp must argue that the multiparty nature of bankruptcy cases and proceedings,239 as well as
the fundamental differences between fraudulent transfer actions brought under § 544(b) and § 548 of the Code, provide a
bright-line test.240 One crucial development has reemerged
amid the post-Stern developments in the bankruptcy, district,
and circuit courts as the silver bullet to bankruptcy court authority—the target of a fraudulent conveyance action filing a
proof of claim.241 A proof of claim, in effect, tethers a defendant
236. Granfinanciera, N.A. v. Norberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989).
237. Kuney, supra note 164, at 6 n.64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
238. See, e.g., Exclusive Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham
Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 561–65 (9th Cir. 2012).
239. See Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 187 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011) (differentiating multiparty nature of bankruptcy with twoparty nature of state law).
240. Section 548 gives a trustee standing to recover prepetition transfer
under federal law. 11 U.S.C. § 548. In comparison, § 544(b) allows a trustee to
avoid prepetition transfers using state law or other applicable nonbankruptcy law by stepping into the shoes of a creditor holding an allowable
unsecured claim. Id. § 544(b). As a result, the trustee may invoke § 544(b) to
take advantage of longer statutes of limitation under state law. See Goldstein
v. Eby-Brown, Inc. (In re Universal Mktg., Inc.), 459 B.R. 573, 580 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting distinction between § 544 and § 549, but concluding
bankruptcy court had final-order authority).
241. See, e.g., Onkyo Eur. Elecs. GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In re
Global Technovations Inc.), 694 F.3d 705, 722–23 (6th Cir. 2012).
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to the bankruptcy court through 11 U.S.C. § 502(d), supplying
“the bankruptcy court with authority to rule on the fraudulent
transfer claim because the fraudulent transfer action becomes
part of the debtor-creditor adjustment.”242
Both camps may have to wait until the next constitutional
challenge reaches the Supreme Court for unresolved questions
from Stern to be settled.243 For now, foreign litigants dragged
into U.S. bankruptcy courts may use Stern, the final hurdle to
adjudication, as a sword. In particular, investment funds, investment banks, and other financial investors that are often
the targets of suits by debtors may find the Stern lineage is
best used offensively.244 Bankruptcy courts are known for efficiently handling heavy dockets and, in a practical sense, things
move faster in bankruptcy court.245 As a result, Stern “has become the mantra of every litigant who, for strategic or tactical
reasons, would rather litigate somewhere other than the bankruptcy court.”246
While foreign counterparties may desire “elsewhere” to be in
another country, any Stern analysis would presume that the
court has already decided to exercise jurisdiction extraterritorially. As such, the Stern analysis affects only the division of
labor between the U.S. federal district and bankruptcy courts,
and not between courts in the United States and in the Eurozone. But as long as the debate over Stern and fraudulent
transfers continues, foreign counterparties will face prolonged
fights over constitutional authority;247 more time for decisions
242. Alaniz, Navigating Through the Post-Stern World, supra note 98, at
10–11 (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 329–30 (1966)).
243. See Springer, Supreme Court’s Answer, supra note 98.
244. See id. at 1; see also Robin E. Phelan et. al., The Peoples and the
Courts Get Confuseder and Confuseder: Recent Ridiculous Rulings from
Bankruptcyland 10 (Aug. 3, 2011) (CLE presentation to Dallas Bar Association) (on file with author).
245. For a recent example of this reality, see In re Baldwin, 700 F.3d 122,
129 (3rd Cir. 2012). The Third Circuit refused to issue a writ of mandamus to
overturn a bankruptcy court order that limited both parties’ time to present
evidence to 7.5 hours in a breach of fiduciary duty case, holding only “that a
post-judgment appeal is adequate to assure meaningful review of the propriety of the time-limit order.” Id. See also Kuney, supra note 164, at 6 n.69.
246. In re Ambac Fin. Grp., 457 B.R. 299, 308 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, No.
10-B-15973, 2011 WL 6844533 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 2011).
247. See Kuney, supra note 164, at 6–8.
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to be appealed, references to be withdrawn, or judgments to be
entered after the bankruptcy court’s submission of proposed
findings;248 and demands for jury trials.249 Although these additional steps were often simply assumed before Stern,250 they
will now cause foreign litigants to expend more time, money,
and resources defending themselves in courts in which they
never intended to litigate.
CONCLUSION: ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE TWO AND A
HALF HURDLES
Each of these hurdles to U.S. adjudication will cause further
argument and delay in cases, inevitably leading to more money
spent.251 But arguments for and against adjudication that have
been persuasive with many courts exist at each hurdle. Foreign
counterparties must argue that the plain meaning of, and congressional intent behind, Chapter 15 provides a clear directive
for U.S. recognition of, and cooperation with, foreign proceedings. In comparison, litigants seeking to obviate Chapter 15
will argue that (1) ambiguity exists related to the United
States exporting its laws;252 (2) domestic creditor interests are
best protected in U.S. courts; or (3) express qualifications requiring that U.S. law be applied elsewhere are necessary.253
Alternatively, counterparties may argue that distressed Eurozone transactions are so egregious as to invoke Chapter 15’s
exception for “manifestly contrary to the public policy of the
United States,”254 although this exception requires a high
standard of proof.255
248. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), (d) (2006) (proposed findings and conclusions
of law by bankruptcy courts require de novo review by district courts, and
referrals to bankruptcy courts may be withdrawn at any time by the district
court sua sponte “for cause shown”).
249. See Granfinanciera, N.A. v. Norberg, 492 U.S. 33, 64, 64 n.19 (1989).
250. See Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp.), 456 B.R.
318, 320–21 (2011).
251. See Kuney, supra note 164, at 9.
252. See Developments in the Law, supra note 110, at 1293.
253. Leong, supra note 94, at 15.
254. 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2006).
255. Compare In re Tri-Continental Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 638 n.16
(Bankr. E.D. Ca. 2006) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109 (2005),
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 183) (observing that this standard “has
been narrowly interpreted by courts around the world” to mean violating “the
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Regarding the extraterritoriality hurdle, several U.S. circuits
have yet to rule on the extraterritorial powers of bankruptcy
courts under the Code. Litigants seeking U.S. adjudication
should use the Affiliate Rule offensively to select a favorable—
or at least neutral—circuit for filing.256 Such litigants must argue that the presumption never arose or, alternatively, that it
has been overcome using the Foley Brothers factors. Foreign
counterparties must argue that the plain language of 11 U.S.C.
§ 541 and other statutes does not provide clear evidence that
Congress intended for the Code to apply extraterritorially.
Finally, parties litigating whether U.S. courts can adjudicate
distressed Eurozone transactions must confront Stern v. Marshall. Foreign counterparties must argue that fraudulent
transfers, whether brought under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) or § 548,
are “quintessentially suits at common law” and “paradigmatic
private rights.”257 Courts will hear a melodic refrain that the
Granfinanciera dicta indicates a right to Article III adjudication in fraudulent transfer proceedings.258 The chorus will echo
that because fraudulent transfer proceedings invoke private
rights, and thus require a jury trial, both Article III and the
Seventh Amendment guarantee an audience before an Article
III judge in an Article III court.259

most fundamental policies” of the host nation), with Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. v.
ACP Master, Ltd. (In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V.), 473 B.R. 117, 133 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2012), aff’d sub nom. Ad Hoc Group of Noteholders v. Vitro S.A.B. de CV,
701 F.3d 1031 (5th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a Mexican plan of reorganization that violated the Absolute Priority Rule and that extinguished guarantee
claims of non-debtor subsidiary entities “manifestly contravene[d] the public
policy of the United States and [was] also precluded from enforcement . . . ”).
256. For instance, although the Second Circuit has yet to rule on extraterritoriality, the Southern District of New York—one of the highest-volume
bankruptcy dockets in the United States—has refused to apply 11 U.S.C.
§ 547 extraterritorially, which would tend to discourage the Second Circuit as
a viable forum for an extraterritorial argument. See Maxwell Comm’n Corp.
v. Barclays Bank PLC (In re Maxwell Comm’n. Corp.), 170 B.R. 800, 814
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d on other grounds, In re Maxwell, 93 F.3d 1036
(2nd Cir. 1996).
257. See Granfinanciera, N.A. v. Norberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989).
258. See id. at 64.
259. Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s Bleak House (Part II): The Statutory Limits of Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER No. 9, at 1,
6 (2011).
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Conversely, counterparties arguing that bankruptcy courts
have constitutional authority must rely on the public rights
doctrine to justify Congress’s allocation of adjudication to nonArticle III courts. Counterparties must argue that the multiparty aspects of bankruptcy260 and the differences between federal and state fraudulent transfer laws signify that an action
under § 548 is not of the “stuff” of 1789. Alternatively, counterparties may be forced to distinguish § 544(b) as having the
“stuff” of 1789 and re-focus the argument on separating § 548.
In either instance, counterparties will seek to silence the Granfinanciera hymn as inapposite dicta. U.S. courts are still in the
midst of determining whether the Constitution permits adjudication of domestic property fraudulently transferred in bankruptcy courts after Stern. But Stern has significant implications on the adjudication of foreign proceedings as well—a prospect that U.S. courts may face in the near future.
This extended analysis of distressed Eurozone deals reaching
U.S. courts requires a number of economic and jurisprudential
events to occur. But as the ASARCO case demonstrates, litigants seeking strategic or tactical advantages are well incentivized to avail themselves of U.S. fraudulent transfer law. As
austerity skirmishes give way to greater financial solidarity,
the Eurozone will be both further protected, and yet paradoxically more exposed, to systemic and acute liquidity risks. Any
number of financial scenarios may soon leave foreign counterparties subjected to opportunistic litigants preparing to challenge the two and a half hurdles to reach U.S. courts.

260. See Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 187 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011).

